Conroe Courier - News
NASA report uncovers flaws in Columbia shuttle safety
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| This undated file photo released by NASA shows STS-107 crew members in their group photo. Space Shuttle Columbia crew, left to right, front row, Rick Husband, Kalpana Chawla, William McCool, back row, David Brown, Laurel Clark, Michael Anderson and Israeli astronaut Ilan Ramon are shown in this undated crew photo. |
By Dana Guthrie
There was no way the Columbia crew could have survived the shuttle’s 2003 crash, but NASA officials have identified several safety issues that could have been avoided.
A report, released Tuesday by the shuttle program’s Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team, describes in detail the event that likely killed the crew and analyzes four more events that would have also been fatal had the crew survived longer.
The space shuttle is set to retire in 2010, and JSC engineers and contractors are in the midst of designing its replacement, the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle and the Ares rocket that will transport astronauts to the moon.
“The results of this investigation are intended to add meaning to the sacrifice of the crew’s lives by making space flight safer for all future generations,” the investigation team said in the report.
Investigators found that the Columbia crew did not have time to protect themselves after cabin pressure decreased, mostly because they were too busy with re-entry procedures to finish putting on protective gear before the accident.
The suits worn by the Columbia crew were not designed at the same time as the shuttle – the suit design was altered twice after the Challenger 7 disaster. Also, the crew must complete a number of cabin stowage tasks prior to re-entry, the report states.
Because helmet visors and gloves can impede those tasks, one crew member was not wearing a helmet and three were not wearing gloves when Columbia lost control. According to trained procedure, those with helmets on had their visors up.
“There was a period of about 40 seconds after the orbiter lost control but prior to depressurization, when the crew was conscious and capable of action,” the report states.
“Part of this short timeframe was undoubtedly employed in recognizing that a problem existed, as the indications of the loss of control developed gradually.”
The investigation found that if crew members had been trained more on the transition between vehicle operations and survival measures, they may have lowered their visors while it was still possible.
Once cabin pressure dropped, even crew members with their helmets on passed out before they could lower their visors and likely did not regain consciousness, investigators said.
When Columbia split into pieces and the crew cabin began to roll, the crew’s upper harnesses did not lock, because they were not designed to do so in those conditions, the report states.
“Helmets that did not conform to the head and the lack of upper body restraint resulted in injuries and lethal trauma” to the unconscious or deceased crew members, investigators said.
Crew module breakup
The third event, and the least-understood, was the crew’s ejection from the seats and cabin. The only way to protect crews from cabin disintegration is to prevent it from happening, the report states. The team also found that seat restraints would have caused traumatic injury had the crew not been killed by previous events.
The fourth lethal event was exposure to the atmosphere during the fall from the destroyed shuttle in near-vacuum, extremely cold conditions. Fatal ground impact was the fifth event.
The team recommends strengthening weak areas of the suit system to protect astronauts from atmospheric conditions.
In addition, the parachutes designed to protect the crew from ground impact require astronauts to activate them manually
Because there has been limited study of spacecraft accidents, the team was forced to make its recommendations with some level of speculation.
The investigation team’s recommendations call for better safety technology that takes more potential emergencies into account and is built into future spacecraft from the start of the design phase.
The team also urges NASA officials to place high priority on crew survival investigations for all future spacecraft mishaps.
A report, released Tuesday by the shuttle program’s Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team, describes in detail the event that likely killed the crew and analyzes four more events that would have also been fatal had the crew survived longer.
The space shuttle is set to retire in 2010, and JSC engineers and contractors are in the midst of designing its replacement, the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle and the Ares rocket that will transport astronauts to the moon.
“The results of this investigation are intended to add meaning to the sacrifice of the crew’s lives by making space flight safer for all future generations,” the investigation team said in the report.
Investigators found that the Columbia crew did not have time to protect themselves after cabin pressure decreased, mostly because they were too busy with re-entry procedures to finish putting on protective gear before the accident.
The suits worn by the Columbia crew were not designed at the same time as the shuttle – the suit design was altered twice after the Challenger 7 disaster. Also, the crew must complete a number of cabin stowage tasks prior to re-entry, the report states.
Because helmet visors and gloves can impede those tasks, one crew member was not wearing a helmet and three were not wearing gloves when Columbia lost control. According to trained procedure, those with helmets on had their visors up.
“There was a period of about 40 seconds after the orbiter lost control but prior to depressurization, when the crew was conscious and capable of action,” the report states.
“Part of this short timeframe was undoubtedly employed in recognizing that a problem existed, as the indications of the loss of control developed gradually.”
The investigation found that if crew members had been trained more on the transition between vehicle operations and survival measures, they may have lowered their visors while it was still possible.
Once cabin pressure dropped, even crew members with their helmets on passed out before they could lower their visors and likely did not regain consciousness, investigators said.
When Columbia split into pieces and the crew cabin began to roll, the crew’s upper harnesses did not lock, because they were not designed to do so in those conditions, the report states.
“Helmets that did not conform to the head and the lack of upper body restraint resulted in injuries and lethal trauma” to the unconscious or deceased crew members, investigators said.
Crew module breakup
The third event, and the least-understood, was the crew’s ejection from the seats and cabin. The only way to protect crews from cabin disintegration is to prevent it from happening, the report states. The team also found that seat restraints would have caused traumatic injury had the crew not been killed by previous events.
The fourth lethal event was exposure to the atmosphere during the fall from the destroyed shuttle in near-vacuum, extremely cold conditions. Fatal ground impact was the fifth event.
The team recommends strengthening weak areas of the suit system to protect astronauts from atmospheric conditions.
In addition, the parachutes designed to protect the crew from ground impact require astronauts to activate them manually
Because there has been limited study of spacecraft accidents, the team was forced to make its recommendations with some level of speculation.
The investigation team’s recommendations call for better safety technology that takes more potential emergencies into account and is built into future spacecraft from the start of the design phase.
The team also urges NASA officials to place high priority on crew survival investigations for all future spacecraft mishaps.
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